News Release

5th February 2004

IRAQ

"I supported the war in Iraq" says Michael Fabricant "but the Prime Minister's claims and counter-claims about the '45 minute warning' make a mockery of life and death for our soldiers and those of Iraqis."

The facts so far:-

24 September 2002 The Government publishes its September dossier. The Prime Minister's foreword to the dossier states that Saddam Hussein's: 'military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them'.

24 September 2002 The Prime Minister says in the House of Commons: '[The dossier makes clear that] Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes.

24 September 2002 The Evening Standard headline reads '45 MINUTES FROM ATTACK'

25 September 2002 The Sun headline reads 'BRITS 45 MINS FROM DOOM' and claims that WMD could be fired at British troops in Cyprus.

5 March 2003 Robin Cook talks to the Prime Minister. According to his book: 'The most revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam's arsenal. I told him: "It's clear from the private briefing that I have had that Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could strike at strategic cities. But he probably does have several thousand battlefield chemical munitions. Do you never worry that he might use them against British troops?"

The Prime Minister says in reply 'Yes, but all the effort he has had to put into concealment makes it difficult for him to assemble them quickly for use' (Robin Cook, The Point of Departure, 2003).

18 March 2003 Robin Cook resigns.

18 March 2003 When asked in the House of Commons [on 4 February 2004] when he knew that the 45 minute claim related to battlefield weapons or small calibre weaponry, the Prime Minister said 'it was not before the debate on 18 March last year'.

18 March 2003 Parliament debates the case for war and votes in favour of military action.

9 September 2003 The Intelligence and Security Committee reports. It concludes 'the context of the intelligence on the 45 minutes claim should have been explained, in particular the fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or biological attack, should have been highlighted in the dossier. The omission of this context and assessment allowed speculation as to its exact meaning.'

22 September 2003 Geoff Hoon is cross-examined at the Hutton Inquiry. He confirms that he knew 45 minutes did not refer to long-range weapons of mass destruction. Jeremy Gompertz (Counsel for the Kelly family): 'Was there any other suggestion that they were not battlefield munitions but strategic munitions?' Geoff Hoon: 'I recall asking what kind of weapons would be deployable within 45 minutes; and the answer is the answer that I have just given to you.' Gompertz: 'Which was shells, battlefield mortars, tactical weapons of that kind?' Hoon: 'Yes.'

22 September 2003 Mr Hoon is asked at the Hutton Inquiry: 'Are you aware that on the 25th of September a number of newspapers had banner headlines suggesting that this related to strategic missiles or bombs?' He replies: 'I can recall, yes.'

28 September 2003 David Blunkett reveals that the 45 minute claim was not discussed by the Cabinet. 'Did the defence secretary, did any of us raise the forty five minutes when we were discussing the dossier?' 'I've already explained we didn't, no' (Dimbleby Programme, 28 September 2003).

4 February 2004 Robin Cook disputes the Prime Minister's claim [in the same debate of 4 February 2004] that the Prime Minister did not know that the 45 minute claim related to battlefield weapons or small calibre weaponry. Robin Cook said: 'I am bound to say that I am surprised by that answer. In my resignation speech I did make the very point that we were considering battlefield weapons and that Saddam probably had no real weapons of mass destruction. I find it difficult to reconcile what I knew and what I am sure the Prime Minister knew at the time we had the vote in March.'

4 February 2004 Geoff Hoon tells the House of Commons that he only investigated the nature of the weapons in the 45 minute claim 'out of curiosity'.

5 February 2004 Geoff Hoon appears on the Today Programme. He is asked when he first saw the forty-five minute claim had become a matter of public interest, when for example he had seen The Sun headline on the day the dossier was published in September; the headline that read, Forty-five Minutes from Doom. He replies: 'The first time I saw that headline was very recently watching a Panorama programme [21 January 2004] that flashed up the front page of The Sun on the screen, and that was the very first time I had ever seen that particular publication.

5 February 2004 Mr Hoon appears on BBC Breakfast. He is asked 'we know you like correcting falsehoods in the media, why didn't you get on to the Editor of The Sun or whatever paper it was in and say look, this is wrong, they couldn't possibly hit London with this weaponry?' He replies 'Well I didn't actually see that newspaper or indeed any other newspaper referring to that issue at the time.' NB. Compare with the evidence that he gave to the Hutton Inquiry on 22 September 2003.

5 February 2004 Geoff Hoon appears before the Defence Select Committee. Mr Hoon reveals that he did not discuss the 45 minute claim with the Prime Minister. 'It was not a matter that we discussed' (Press Association, 5 February 2004).